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Abstract  
 The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the functional 
background diversity of boards of directors on banks’ strategy. This 
relationship is examined using the annual reports between 2005 and 2014 for 
16 Lebanese banks. Logistic regression analysis indicates that board 
diversity is positively associated with the strategies adopted by banks. 
Implications for both strategic management and future research are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
 With the recent financial crisis that hit the world, the importance and 
weight of the banking sector are highlighted. Many researchers have tried to 
analyze the crises and their effects. The Basel Committee has issued several 
reports (Basel I, Basel II and Basel III), to try to govern banks and protect 
stakeholders. 
 The financial instability and the recent crisis marked the global 
economy, especially the emerging and developing ones that were affected by 
very large bank failures, which is not the case in Lebanon. Lebanon has 
experienced major economic and financial crises since 2006. What is 
interesting is that the banking sector is still experiencing some stability 
despite these internal and regional crises.  
 The strategic choice is still considered a theoretical and managerial 
challenge. Academics and practitioners have studied this process from 
various angles. Both of them agreed on the complexity and multiplicity of 
factors that may affect the strategic choice. There are several empirical 
studies, especially in the United States, which focus on this subject. 
 The majority of the existing literature on banking crises seeks 
especially to analyze its causes. There is a lack of studies that focused on 
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analyzing the effect of the functional origin of the management teams (Top 
Management Teams and Board of directors) on strategic choices in times of 
crisis. This prompted us to analyze the possible link between the functional 
origin of the Board of Directors and the strategies adopted by Lebanese 
banks in times of crisis.  
 The first concept identified in this research would be to study the 
effect of functional origins of directors on the chosen strategies. The second 
identified concept in this research would be to study the effect of crisis sis on 
the strategies adopted by the banks. 
 To examine the relationship between board of director diversity and 
banks strategies, we first discuss the Lebanese banking sector. Then we 
discuss the concepts of strategy, the Functional background, the relationship 
between Diversity and strategy and the crisis in banks. Finally, we examine 
the specific relationship between board diversity and banks strategies. 
 
The Lebanese banking sector 
 Lebanese banks play an important role in financing the Lebanese 
economy and a critical role in stabilizing monetary policy and in the 
development of the payment systems. In addition, This banking sector is by 
far the most advanced sector in Lebanon with total deposits of about 60 
billion US dollars, which is equivalent to more than three times its gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Shahin and Safieddine, 2008). 
 Some studies on the banking sector have found that it is the 
complexity of the financial systems in place that led to bad practices 
(Albouy, 2013). Others tried to analyze the specifics of bank governance 
which functions to limit excessive risk taking (Scialom, 2013; Lopez, 2010). 
 There are two regulating bodies in Lebanon. Banks and other 
financial institutions are all under the jurisdiction of the central bank, the 
Bank of Lebanon (BDL), which holds the authority of regulating the 
industry. The central bank controls the entry of banks in the industry, defines 
the fields of banking and creates prudential banking regulations and codes of 
practice. The Banking Control Commission (BCC) established in 1967 holds 
supervisory authority over the banking sector. It is responsible for 
supervising banking activities and ensure compliance with the various 
banking and financial regulations. The banking activities are also subject to 
the Code of Commerce (1942) and the Code of Money and Credit 
(1963).The recent progress, especially in the last decade, wouldn’t be 
possible without the presence of a suitable banking regulation, supervision 
made by the BDL and the BCC, and cooperation with the Association of 
Lebanese Banks (ABL) (BDL, 2016). 
 The banks have become the weak link in the international financial 
systems while in Lebanon, they remain key players, and the Lebanese 
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banking sector has remained stable and financially strong. Banks continue to 
have a vital role in the economy, in which banks continue to dominate the 
financial system and remain the main lenders for individuals and companies. 
Several annual studies showed that this sector remains the main driver of 
growth in Lebanon (IMF, 2009; World Bank, 2011; ABL, 2016). 
 The position of Lebanese banks is unique in the Middle East with a 
rapid development since the 1990s. During the 2007 financial crisis, 
Lebanese banks have remained secure and totally unaffected by the crisis, 
because of the legislation of the "Lebanese Reserve Banks "that does not 
allow Lebanese banks to invest in structured products at high risk. Moreover, 
Lebanese banks have always maintained a relatively high liquidity in 
Lebanese pounds (LBP) and foreign currencies spread between domestic and 
external markets. The liquidity in this sector has played an important role in 
safeguarding the banking sector (Zreika and Elkanj, 2011). 
 Deposits, profits and lending activities have been increasing since 
2003. The Financial crisis have given Lebanese banks a huge boost with an 
increase in deposits of 15.6%, total assets of 14.6%, total loans of 18.64% 
and net profit by nearly 30% in 2008. Most banks in advanced economies 
depend on credit or financial markets as the main sources of funding while 
Lebanese banks depend on deposits.  
 The Lebanese banking sector has experienced a healthy activity 
period after the financial crisis of 2007, with an unprecedented growth in 
lending. In total, loans increased by 58.35%: 15.32 billion US dollars in 
2006 to 24,259,000,000 in 2009. This means that banks have been able to 
provide the credits needed to grow the economy while other credit banks 
around the world have witnessed subdued lending activities in the context of 
a slow recovery (Zreika and Elkanj, 2011). 
 In conclusion, the Lebanese banking sector was and still financially 
stable. It plays an important role in the Lebanese economy, in which banks 
dominate the financial system of the country and are the major suppliers of 
credits to individuals and enterprises. 
  
Strategy  
 The strategies are organized according to factors around the company 
and are in some way related to the behavior of the organization. A vast 
literature exists on the role of individuals, such as the CEO, in the 
development of strategies, the results of the strategic behavior studies were 
generally: 
- Focused on the strategic choice (e.g. types of diversification);  
- Focused on the outcomes (measured for example by using some 
indicators of success such as profits or revenues ...). 
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 Some banks have had striking success (Bank One in the late 90s), 
while others lived spectacular failures simultaneously (Dresdner Bank and 
Deutsche Bank in Germany, after their failed a merger attempt in 2000). Is it 
a bad strategic choice? 
 The changes that happened in the banking industry around the world 
over the last 15 years are a good indicator. These failures are often attributed 
to poor definition of strategy or an error in the pursuit of goals. 
 Banks have recognized the need to redefine and to improve their 
strategic formulating in order to avoid failure. In recent years, the strategic 
transformations of several major international banks were numerous and 
unexpected, especially during crises, but there is no exact recommendation 
on strategic options for these banks. These strategies are part of a field whose 
perimeter is clear and defined: to set limitations over the activities and to 
avoid dispersion. Among the variables affecting the strategies of a bank, we 
found the types of products or services, the customers, the technology 
available and the geographic area in which banks operate. 
 In 1996, Porter defined competitive strategy as “About being 
different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver 
a unique mix of value”. Strategy is “The art of building sustainably 
profitable advantages over their environment by reducing uncertainty, 
innovation, locks, synergies, flexibility”. Diemer (2010) classified 
diversification strategies by reasoning in terms of objectives pursued or 
material contexts in which companies are located. He classified these 
strategies into two types: defensive diversification which is motivated by the 
need to supplement or replace a defective core business and the offensive 
diversification which is adopted in order to take advantage of an existing 
competitive advantage and to master new technologies. 
 The Lebanese banks had an expansion in their activities during the 
latest economic crisis. The Lebanese banking sector has remained stable, 
which led the Lebanese banks to choose diversification strategies (BDL, 
2016). In our research we found the strategic choices could be classified 
under two categories 
- Defensive strategy; 
- Offensive strategy. 
 
Functional background  
 The skills and cognitive bases of a person is largely a reflection of his 
/ her level of education. A more educated person will have a wider and more 
complex cognitive functioning (Dollinger, 1984). 
 The functional origin of the Boards of Directors has been studied 
since the early 1980. Gupta in 1984 found that in regards the directors of 
non-diversified companies, the functional origin in accounting or in finance 
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is more important than experience in any other field. While in regards of the 
directors of a vertically integrated companies, a functional origin in 
production or in operations may be the most critical. In the case of 
diversified companies with shared resources and common facilities, the 
functional background in marketing and sales, production and research and 
development is the most important. This means that the intention of gaining 
market share appears to have particularly strong demand for marketing skills. 
 In 1993, Fligstein found that people "who have spent their careers in 
the marketing of production are mainly interested in increasing product sales 
... Having spent their careers in the analysis of problems from a certain 
theoretical point of view, they will see and analyze all problems through this 
specific theoretical perspective.” The Data that he used from US companies 
for the period 1919 - 1979 showed that the origins of CEOs are linked to 
their organization and to the strategies adopted.  
 Other found contradictory results, the directors in highly diversified 
companies - having strategies that are related or unrelated - generally have 
little knowledge of the business operation, the industry, the technology, the 
geographic region (Dundas and Richardson, 1982). These directors tend to 
focus almost exclusively on the financial results, including the profit for the 
period and the rate of return on investment (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Hoskisson et al, 1999). 
 Several studies have shown that leaders are chosen because they 
bring a needed experience or because they adapt to the applied 
diversification strategies. (Awino et al, 2011; Tihanyi et al, 2000; Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996;; Michel and Harnbrick, 1992; Bantel and Jackson, 
1989; Song, 1982). In the literature there is a vast number of studies that 
investigated the relationship between strategies and the functional origins of 
CEOs and boards of directors. Most of these studies agree on the fact that the 
functional origin in terms of education or experience is connected to the 
strategic choice of the company. This fact has motivated us to go further in 
exploring this link. 
  
Diversity and strategy 
 Lado et al. (1992) argued that the managerial characteristics are 
considered one of the most important skills that benefit businesses in the 
formulation of the strategy. 
 Traditionally, the board was seen as powerless and even useless, but 
this vision has changed and directors are seen as an active part in the 
companies, just as the CEOs. Both directors and CEOs should work together 
to improve the management of the company and to choose better strategies. 
Salem and Hamza (2003) found that the behavior of the directors has 
undergone two major changes: first from passive into active, second from the 
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de-contextualized into the contextualized roles. Directors today have become 
an active and socialized part of the firm. 
Figure 1: Model depicting the relationship between board compositions of the corporate 
strategy: 
 
Source: Hoskisson and Baysinger, (1990) 
 
 Hoskisson and Baysinger (1990) describe the relationship between 
the board composition and strategy. Directors must intervene based on the 
financial performance of the company, or according to their direct 
observations of the decision making process. However, the ability to perform 
this function is not the same in all types of companies, especially when the 
quantity and quality of information held by internal directors is higher than 
those held by outside directors. Previously in 1989, the same authors found 
evidence that the choice of strategies is affected by the way internal controls 
are structured between directors and CEOs. A well-organized work in a 
company involves parties that are responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of strategies, and other parties that provide capital and are 
willing to assume the risk of loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The support 
of risk is needed when strategic assets are deployed, because it is not known 
if the difference between the revenues and the costs of production and 
distribution will be positive, negative or zero. For this reason, it is best to 
assign responsibility of control the board, avoiding that CEOs being the only 
evaluators of their own performance and therefore offers a certain guarantee 
for the investments. 
 Hendry and Kiel (2004) argued that the boards are held accountable 
to the organizations they lead. They recommended that administrators, 
because of their experience and the fact that a thorough understanding of the 
strategy of a company facilitates the control function, should work with the 
CEOs in the development of strategic plans. 
 Hilb in 2005 in his study on the boards, found four main conditions 
for the successful development, implementation and monitoring of the 
company's strategy: 
- The composition of strategic board; 
- Constructive culture and the openness of the Board; 
- Effective board structure; 
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- And the orientation of the board as a measure of success. 
 The theories and research on social learning processes suggests that 
boards are more favorable to consider adopting the strategies of other 
organizations when these strategies are associated with favorable outcomes 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
 Some found that the functional origin of the CEO will have a small 
effect compared to the effect of the board Westphal and Frederickson (2001). 
In a recent study, the Central Bank of Lebanon found that the majority of 
Lebanese banks chose diversification as a growth mode (BDL, 2016).  
 We draw from these studies that the characteristics of the directors 
will have an effect on the selection, implementation, and control of 
strategies. In our article, we try to prove that the functional origins of the 
board will influence the strategic choices especially in times of crisis. 
 
Other factors linked to strategies 
 In the literature we found many factures related to strategies. One of 
the most important variables studied is the age of the directors, older 
directors tend to be more cautious (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
 Some studies have shown that moderate levels of demographic 
homogeneity or similarity of behavior help to promote integration between 
board members, while a great diversity is a source of conflict and an element 
that will limit the productivity of the group (O'Reilly, Snyder and Boothe, 
1993). 
 Sanders and Carpenter (1998) suggest that the size of the board 
reflects the diversity of its members, their backgrounds, their sources of 
information, especially their collective ability to handle complex information 
arising from globalization. However, the size of the team is usually alone a 
poor indicator of the diversity (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
 
Crisis in Banks 
 The failure of a large bank or of several banks in one country can 
cause sudden contraction of the money supply or the bankruptcy of the 
payment system. This can result in a serious disorder of the economy that 
creates obligations for the government. The bankruptcy of a bank, even the 
smallest, can lead to a loss of confidence in the system, even if the 
government in question is capable of handling the banking crisis in a 
systematic and orderly manner (www.fao.org). 
 Despite all efforts to support financial stability, the banking industry 
in many "developed" and "developing" countries has experienced several 
difficulties since the 80’s. The affected financial institutions have suffered 
severe losses; some of them became insolvent, while others went bankrupt. 
In addition, in many developing countries, banking crises were very 
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frequent. A large proportion of insolvencies in the banking systems were 
partially caused by macro-economic events (The World Bank, 2011). 
 In developing countries in general and Lebanon in particular, it is 
difficult to gather reliable information about the financial crisis. Although 
many causes of financial crises in developing countries are similar to those 
observed in industrialized countries, the situation is more complex. Problems 
can be macro-economic, sectorial and institutional.  
 The majority of these problems that are related to the economic 
policies were linked to common deficiencies. Among the most common 
causes (Angora and Tarazi, 2011): 
- Banks were poorly managed; 
- Evaluations of loans and monitoring were insufficient; 
- Loans to customers recognized in difficulty; 
- Banks owned unbalanced portfolios; 
- Lack of internal control; 
- High operational costs; 
- Inadequate policies adopted by banks facing difficulties; 
- Bankers pledged to suspicious transactions, especially in the real 
estate sector, in order to acquire funds to cover losses during crises; 
- Existing fraud to cover certain cases of bank failures. 
 In developing countries, the instability of financial institutions 
should’ve been controlled by the financial regulation and by the banking 
supervision authority, which is the case in Lebanon. But the banking 
supervision authority was often subject to political pressure from powerful 
interest groups who control the banking and commercial sectors. Throughout 
Latin America, Asia and Africa, bank supervision was unable to maintain 
control on banks in difficulties, which aggravated the effects of crisis 
(Polizatto, 1990). 
 In 2008, a global financial crisis occurred. This financial crisis had 
started earlier in 2007 with the loss of confidence in the real estate markets in 
the United States. Because of this credit crisis in the US, there was a global 
reduction of all expenses, greatly affecting the global economy. This created 
a period of high volatility, followed by the failure of many banks around the 
world. Many large multinational financial institutions have experienced an 
imminent failure. 
 The main causes of these crises were (Boyer et al., 2004; Stiglitz and 
Uy; 1996): 
- macroeconomic instability related to inadequate economic and 
financial policies; 
- Bad bank management; 
- Fraud; 
- Cascade bankruptcy from foreign banks. 
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 Crises and uncertainty cause instability. The stability of the financial 
and banking system is a major economic concern of any government 
especially in developing countries where the economy depends on this 
system. 
 
Hypothesis 
 The purpose of our study is to find a relationship between the 
selected variables in the Lebanese banking sector. We have chosen to limit 
the empirical part of our research on four assumptions that we believe 
important to the commercial banking sector in Lebanon. Several reasons 
justify our choice of the key factors among a large number that exists in the 
literature. 
 Research in the banking sector and in other sectors has shown the 
important role played by these factors. In addition, the qualitative studies of 
one or more banks also demonstrated the importance of these factors. The 
interviews with board members guided us to these factors. Previous research 
showed that the skills and cognitive bases of a person is largely a reflection 
of their level of education. Several studies examining the effects of the 
characteristics of boards (such as size, age, demographics, heterogeneity, 
functional origin, etc.) on the process of strategic decision (Carson et al, 
2004). All these studies validate several theories of decision making within 
groups. They can provide a theoretical basis for understanding the effects of 
board characteristics on strategic decision making process (Hambrick et al., 
2005, Daellenbach et al., 1999; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
 Watson et al. (1993) showed that in a homogeneous team, members 
tend to act, to think and to behave in very similar ways. It would be 
important to know whether these groups adopt a defensive strategy in times 
of crisis.  
 Our first set of hypotheses is: 
 H1a: In normal times, a homogeneous Board chooses an offensive 
strategy of diversification and growth. 
 H1b: In times of crisis, a homogeneous Board chooses a defensive 
strategy. 
 The heterogeneity is often seen as one reason for productivity and 
innovation in teams, groups and organizations (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
Mannix and Neale, 2005). The increase in heterogeneity improves the quality 
of ideas and promotes creativity, especially in complex crisis environments 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996; Boeker, 1997; Van Knippenberg et al, 2004; 
Cannella et al., 2008; Deszo and Ross, 2012). These studies showed that the 
teams with different functional backgrounds have advantages regarding the 
strategic choice (e.g., Hambrick et al., 1996) because they engage in a more 
comprehensive research using more information from multiple sources 
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(Hastie and Tibshirani, 1986). These heterogeneous teams consider several 
solutions and have more creativity in their actions (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
 Our main concern is to test whether a heterogeneous group can be 
structured to pull the benefits of heterogeneity, even in times of crisis. 
 Our second set of hypotheses is: 
 H2a: In normal times, a heterogeneous Board chooses an offensive 
strategy of diversification and growth. 
 H2b: In times of crisis, a heterogeneous Board chooses an offensive 
strategy of diversification and growth. 
  
Method  
Sample 
 This study is based on a sample of 16 Lebanese banks operating in 
Lebanon. It covers a period of ten years, between 2005 and 2014. The 
composition of this sample is random. The size of the selected management 
teams varies between 4 and 13 members, with an average of 9 members. 
 Data on education of  board members, the size of the bank, the 
number of members, the experience of members and the average age of 
members was collected by various means:  from the annual reports; from the 
personal pages of some members, or from face-to-face or telephone 
interviews with the board members. All the previous variables were 
measured using nominal scales. 
 
Measures  
 1. The composition of Boards  
 Many studies used the functional origin as the independent variable 
(Buyl et al, 2010; Cao et al., 2010; Canella et al., 2008; Boone and Hendriks, 
2007; Herrmann et Datta 2005; Menguc and Auh, 2005; Carpenter, 2002; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick et al, 1996). Similar to these 
studies, we chose to test/divide this functional origin into two groups, 
homogeneous and heterogeneous. 
 To measure the composition of boards, we used the educational 
background of members. We divided the boards, into two groups: 
- If more than 50% of members have similar education, the team is 
considered homogeneous. 
- If less than 50% of members have a similar education, the team is 
considered heterogeneous. 
 We measure the experience in terms of years spent by the member in 
the banking industry.  
 2. Strategy 
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 We have chosen to use the paragraph approach "Paragraph 
Approach" of Miles and Snow (1978). This approach has already been used 
in studies in the banking sector. For example, James and Hatten (1995) 
investigated the validity of this paragraph approach in the banking industry 
using the typology of Miles and Snow, and concluded that this measuring 
instrument is useful and valid. In a recent study, O'Regan and Ghobadian 
(2006) proved that this paragraph approach is an appropriate and reliable 
medium to classify the strategies of companies. 
 While we were coding the speeches of leaders, we found that two 
types of strategies exist: offensive strategies of diversification and defensive 
strategies of diversification. So we opted to test strategies in offensive and 
defensive (Plambeck and Weber, 2010). We were also influenced by the 
study Hambrick et al. (1996), which tested the effect of the heterogeneity of 
Top management teams on business performance by coding the strategies 
into offensive and defensive. Diemer (2010) found two types of strategies: 
“It may well be a defensive diversification driven by the need to supplement 
or replace a faulty core business, or an offensive diversification intended to 
enjoy a competitive advantage and master new technologies.” 
 3. Crisis 
 To better understand the effect of the crisis, we used a binary 
measure, where 0 is for normal periods without crisis, and 1 for the crisis 
periods (Chevet, 1993). These data were collected on the Central Bank's 
website and from the Association of Lebanese Banks. 
 4. Control variables 
 Most of the previous studies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter, 
2002; Herrmann and Datta, 2005; Hambrick, 2007; Cannelle et al., 2008; 
Cao et al., 2010) used similar control variables in terms of age, company size 
and the size of the teams. In coding the boards’ size we used the number of 
members, as for the age we used the average age of the members. The size of 
the bank and the size of the board were collected from the annual reports and 
used in log. 
  
Analysis 
 In this article we have chosen to use logistic regression to test our 
hypotheses for a basic reason, that is that Logistic regression analysis 
requires that the dependent variable is dichotomous and the independent 
variables could be metric or dichotomous. 
 Our model consists of six variables, four control variables, a 
moderating variable and the dependent variable as the pillars of our 
implementation research scheme. 
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Results 
 Overall, two regressions were performed. The binary logistic 
regression is conducted twice, once for the homogeneous group and once for 
the heterogeneous group.  
 Then moderation tests were performed to examine whether the 
control variables such as age, bank size and group size will affect the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variables. 
 
 We noticed that none of the independent variables in this analysis had 
a standard error larger than 2.0. The check for standard errors larger than 2.0 
does not include the standard error for the Constant.  
 The probability of the Wald statistic for the variable “Crisis” is 0.007 
< 0.05. The null hypothesis that the b coefficient for Crisis was equal to zero 
was rejected. This means crisis coefficient is significantly different than 0. 
This supports the relationship that “in times of crisis” homogenous teams are 
Results obtained for the homogeneous group 
Table 1: Tests of model specification: 
  chi-square test ddl Sig. 
Step 1 Step 7.125 1 .004 
Bloc 7.125 1 .004 
Model 29.476 4 .000 
 
 In a hierarchical logistic regression, the presence of a relationship 
between the dependent variable and combination of independent variables 
entered after the control variables have been included is based on the 
statistical significance of the block chi-square for the second block of 
variables in which the predictor independent variables are included.  
 In this analysis, the probability of the block chi-square (7.125) was 
0.004 less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.05. The null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the model with only a constant 
and the control variables versus the model with the predictor independent 
variables was rejected. The contribution of the relationship between the 
predictor independent variables and the dependent variable was supported.  
Table 2: Variables in the equation 
 B E.S. Wald ddl Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Experience -.091 .121 .563 1 .453 .913 
Age -.063 .101 .591 1 .296 .937 
Size_Bank .000 .000 2.372 1 .101 1.000 
Crisis 1.601 .565 6.127 1 .007 6.35 
Constant 6.780 6.014 1.997 1 .122 2234.098 
a. Variable(s) entered in step 1: Crisis. 
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more likely to choose defensive strategies, approximately 6 times more 
likely to choose defensive strategy. And in normal times they are less likely 
to choose defensive strategies, so more likely to choose offensive strategies. 
The value of Exp(B) was 6.35 (>1 and B>0)  which implies that if one unit 
increases in “Crisis” it increases the odds by approximately six times that 
board members choose defensive strategies. 
 The crisis factor influences the strategy chosen by homogeneous 
boards. The results confirm both hypotheses H1a and H1b. 
Results obtained for the heterogeneous group 
Table 3: Tests of model specification: 
  chi-square test ddl Sig. 
Step 2 step .000 1 1.000 
Bloc .000 1 1.000 
Model 31.127 4 .000 
 
 In this test, the probability of the block chi-square was 1 greater than 
the level of significance of 0.05. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference between the model with only a constant and the control 
variables versus the model with the predictor independent variables. The 
contribution of the relationship between the predictor independent variables 
and the dependent variable was not supported. There is no relationship 
between the crisis and the strategies for the heterogeneous boards.  
Table 4: Variables in the equation 
 A E.S. Wald ddl Sig. Exp(B) Stage 
1a 
Experience -2.353 2669.828 .000 1 .988 .105 
Age -6.460 2894.717 .000 1 .999 .002 
Size_Bank .000 .000 .000 1 .997 1.000 
Crisis -.986 15874.115 .000 1 1.000 .460 
Constant 466.024 123457.438 .000 1 .989 3586.257 
a. Variable(s) entered in step 1: Crisis.      
 The probability of the Wald statistic for the variable “Crisis” is 1 > 
0.05. The null hypothesis that the b coefficient for Crisis is equal to zero was 
not rejected. This means that the crisis coefficient is not significantly 
different from 0. This supports the relationship that in both cases, “in time of 
crisis” or “in normal times”, the strategy is not affected for heterogeneous 
boards. A heterogeneous board does not change the strategy in times of 
crisis. The crisis does not push these boards to choose defensive strategies. 
The results confirm both hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
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Discussion 
 Our study is the result of several fundamental questions. Would the 
level of homogeneity between boards’ members in terms of functional origin 
have an impact on strategies adopted by banks in the Lebanese banking 
sector? If one understands the influence of functional origins, what do we 
gain in terms of knowledge? Will crises in the banking industry have an 
effect on the relationship that lies between the functional origins of the 
management teams and the strategic choice? 
 We find that it is the degree of homogeneity in terms of functional 
origin between boards’ members that influences the strategic choice. The 
education plays a major role in this relationship and its influence is 
significant. We noticed that if the experience is tested alone, it will also have 
a significant role. But the effect of the experience loses its meaning when 
tested along with the education.  
 The results obtained are encouraging. Testing hypotheses confirm 
some of our assumptions. Concerning the significance of the results, it seems 
that the academic education is the main factor that will affect the chosen 
strategy in times of crisis, which is logical in times of uncertainties. 
 Our tests show that it is the composition of the boards (in terms of 
educations) that will have a significant influence on the strategy. This applies 
in times of crisis as well as in normal times. Thus, when most members of 
the board have similar academic backgrounds, the strategy in times of crisis 
tends to be defensive, while in normal times the chosen strategies are 
offensive. While when most members of the board have different academic 
background, the crisis tends to have no effect on the strategy and the 
majority of boards choose offensive strategy at all times. 
 We found that, in similarity to the studies of Zorn (2004), Carpenter 
et al. (2001), Certo et al. (2006), the functional background of members will 
affect the strategy. 
 In his study, first we tried to test the link between the functional 
background of boards and strategies, taking into account the effect of crisis.  
Our sample was limited to 16 banks over a period of 10 years, which gave us 
one hundred and sixty observations to test. 
 The tests show that it is the boards’ composition in terms of academic 
background that will affect the strategic choices. To improve the explanatory 
power of our models, three additional control variables were used: 
- The average age of boards; 
- The size of banks; 
- The size of boards. 
  Interesting results emerge from our tests, and we have learned four 
lessons. The first is that as in previous research, we found that when 
measured alone, the experience will affect the strategic choices. The second 
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is that the effect of the experience loses its meaning if it tested along with 
education, which could be explained by the uncertainty surrounding the 
crisis, in addition in our sample the average experience of boards are very 
close between banks, between 22 and 24 years on average. The third lesson, 
even if we had not been able to test it empirically, is that the entrenchment 
exists. For the period spanning over ten years and for the sixteen banks 
tested, there were only four changes in the management teams: two changes 
upon the death of two members and the other two changes occurred when 
two members were elected as deputies. 
 
Limitations 
 Our study has several limitations. A total of 52 commercial banks 
operate in Lebanon, our initial sample size is considered small. Only 32 
banks were appropriate candidates for data collection over a period of 10 
years as we excluded the Lebanese banks with Arab control, the Arab and 
Foreign banks. Our sample, the 16 banks represents 34.6% of the total banks 
population, and 50% of the eligible banks. We were limited to 16 banks 
because, for unknown reasons, the other banks refused to provide copies of 
the missing annual reports and these reports were not posted online! The 
strategy was coded from the speech of the CEO, even if a second coding was 
done, it implies that the answers are not scientific and do not rely on 
numbers, but on perceptions. Because of the existing fraud in the Lebanese 
market, some companies produce erroneous annual reports intended to evade 
taxes, this may be the case in banks. Unfortunately, the existing political 
intervention in all sectors and industries in Lebanon can reduce the effect of 
Boards members on the strategic choice. In our sample and during the 
coding, we found two types of strategies: offensive and defensive strategies 
of diversification. The average board members’ experience is similar in all 
banks, which could be the reason that prevented us from finding a significant 
relationship. There were only four changes in board members, we found that 
these changes are caused mainly by two factors: the death of a member, or 
his election as depute or minister and according to the Lebanese law, when 
elected they do not have the right to work in a private company. We noticed 
that some these members resumed their former jobs at the end of their 
mandate. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, similar to previous studies, we found a link between 
the characteristics of boards and the strategic choice whether normal times or 
in times of crisis. A surprising result in our study is that we have not found a 
link between age, experience of boards and the strategic choice. Noting that, 
our study is one of the rare studies that investigate the effect of the 
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characteristics of boards on the strategic choice, while taking into 
consideration the impact of crises. 
 By comparing our results to previous studies, our empirical tests 
show that the functional origin will affect the strategic choice (Zimmerman, 
2008; Bunderson, 2003; Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001; 
Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Govindarajan, 1989; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
However, unlike other studies (Alexiev et al, 2010; Certo et al., 2006; Cho 
and Hambrick, 2006; Beal and Yasai-Ardekani, 2000; Rajagopalan and 
Datta, 1996; Bantel and Jackson, 1989), the experience of boards in the 
banking industry when tested alone will have an effect, but if we test it along 
with the education it loses its significance. The crises variable has largely led 
to contradict previous studies mainly because of the uncertainty that exists 
during the times of crisis. 
 Previous studies that used the size of banks, the size of boards and the 
age of boards have found contradictory results (Kor and Misangyi, 2008; 
Goll et al., 2008; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007; Kor, 2006; Carpenter, 
2002; Richard and Shelor, 2002). In our study, we found no effect for these 
three variables on the strategic choices. Our study could be used as basis for 
future research in one way or another:  
 An empirical study using a larger number of variables. The number 
of variables in the literature is quite important. Moreover, empirical studies 
using other factors or combinations of factors rather than those we used are 
recommended (compensation, entrenchment ...) 
1. In-depth case studies of more in-depth qualitative studies of Lebanese 
commercial banks are another important angle for future research.  
2. Repeat the same study but using a larger sample; 
3. Empirical or qualitative studies using the same factors in the banking 
industry in other countries.  
4. Finally, empirical and qualitative studies using the same factors, but 
in a different industry. 
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